Abstract: This paper presents a general equilibrium analysis of economic efficiency under externalities, transaction costs and non-convexity. It applies to market exchange as well as contractual arrangements. We show that the Coase theorem continues to hold under general conditions: the efficient management of externalities remains consistent with aggregate profit maximization under transaction costs and non-convexity. We examine the role of transaction costs and explore how the minimization of transaction costs is an integral part of efficient allocations. We also show how our analysis applies under nonconvex technology, provided that we allow for non-linear pricing in markets.
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Coase Revisited: Economic Efficiency under Externalities, Transaction Costs and Non-Convexity
Introduction
Ronald Coase's seminal contributions to economics earned him the Nobel Prize in economics in 1991. He is best known for two of his articles: his 1937 paper which stresses the importance of transaction costs to explain the nature and limits of firms (Coase 1937) ; and his 1960 paper that examined economic efficiency in the presence of externalities among economic agents (Coase 1960) . Each paper addressed a different set of issues. Coase (1937) used transaction costs to study the limits of organization and the role of markets. And Coase (1960) focused on the efficient management of externalities without transaction costs. It generated the so-called Coase theorem, stating that the efficient management of externalities is consistent with aggregate profit maximization. But this creates a significant puzzle: ignoring transaction costs fails to provide the economic insights needed to assess the role of markets versus non-market institutions. 1 Coase himself was well aware of this unresolved puzzle. He wrote: "I tend to regard the Coase theorem as a stepping stone on the way to an analysis of an economy with positive transaction costs" (Coase, 1992, p. 717) . The objective of this paper is to resolve this puzzle. This is done by examining the efficiency of resource allocation in the presence of both transaction costs and externalities.
A related line of inquiries relates to the role of competitive markets versus government in resource allocation. It is well known that, under convexity conditions, competitive markets can implement an efficient allocation (Debreu) . This has stimulated much interest in relying on market institutions and decentralized decision making to support efficient allocations. But institutional choices go beyond government and competitive markets. As emphasized by Coase 4 convexity and transaction costs on economic efficiency are discussed in sections 6 and 7.
Implications for the decentralization of decision making are evaluated in section 8. Finally, section 9 concludes.
Preliminaries
Consider an economy consisting of m goods and n economic agents. We distinguish between two mutually exclusive groups of agents: consumers and producers. Let N c be the set of n c consumers, and N s the set of n s producers. The set of all agents is N = N c  N s = {1, 2, …, n}, where n = n c + n s . The i-th consumer chooses a consumption bundle x i = (x i1 , …, x im )  X i  R m , i  N c . When the k-th good is a consumer good, it is represented by positive numbers: x ik ≥ 0; and when the k-th good represents household labor, it is given by a negative number: x ik ≤ 0. The set X i is the feasible set for x i , i  N c . We assume that the feasible set X i is convex and has a lower bound, i  N c . The i-th consumer has a preference relation represented by the utility function u i (x i ), assumed continuous and quasi-concave 2 on X i , i  N c . Let x  (x 1 , …, x n ), where x  X  X 1 …X n c .
The allocation of m goods among the n agents also involves production and exchange activities. The production activities of the j-th producer are denoted by y j = (y j1 , …, y jm )  R m , j  N s . When the k-th good is an output, it is represented by a positive number: y jk ≥ 0; and when it is an input, it is represented by a negative number: y jk ≤ 0. Let y  (y 1 , …, y n s )  Y  R mn s , where Y is the feasible set for production activities. Note that, in general, the feasible set Y represents a joint production process, allowing for externalities among producers.
Exchange can take place among agents. Denote the exchange between the j-th and the i- sold by agent j to agent i is represented by a positive number, t jik ≥ 0. And the quantity acquired by agent j from agent i is represented by a negative number, t jik ≤ 0, k = 1, …, m. Thus, for the jth producer, t jik  0 when the k-th good is an output, and t jik  0 when the k-th good is an input, j  N s . And for the i-th consumer, t jik ≥ 0 when the k-th good is a consumer good, and t jik ≤ 0 when the k-th good is labor, i  N c . We assume that the following equalities hold: t ji = -t ij for i  N s and j  N s , t ji = -t ij for i  N c and j  N c , and t ii = 0 for all i  N. These restrictions are included in the definition of the feasible set Z. Thus, feasible exchange is denoted by (-z, t)  Z, where the notation "-z" is used to reflect that the z's are inputs in the process of producing exchange services t. Again, note that this allows for externalities in exchange among agents.
Throughout, we assume that the sets Y, Z, and X are closed, and that (0, 0)  Z, i.e. that the absence of exchange requires no resources z. In addition, we assume that the set ( iN c X i )  { jN s y j : (y 1 , …, y n )  Y} has a non-empty interior. Importantly, we do not restrict the feasible sets Y and Z to be convex. As noted in the introduction, non-convexity can naturally arise in the presence of fixed costs. This applies to production activities (e.g., setup cost of producing some output) as well as exchange activities (e.g., search cost in exchange). Thus, we allow the sets Y and Z to be non-convex.
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Definition 1: A feasible allocation is a vector (x, y, z, t) satisfying
and
where x  X, y  Y, (-z, t)  Z. Equation (1a) applies to all goods in y j = (y j1 , …, y jm ), j  N s . When the k-th good is an output for the j-th producer, we have y jk  0 and t jik  0, and (1a) implies that the j-th producer cannot sell more than its production y jk net of resources used in exchange z jk , j  N s .
Alternatively, when the k-th good is an input for the j-th producer, we have y jk  0 and t jik  0, and (1a) implies that the j-th producer's use of the k-th input (|y jk | + z jk ) cannot exceed its
Similarly, equation (1b) applies to all goods in x i = (x i1 , …, x im ), i  N c . When the k-th good is a consumer good, we have x ik  0, and (1b) implies that the i-th consumer cannot consume more than what it can acquire ( jN t jik ), net of resources used in exchange z ik , i  N c .
When i  N c and j  N c \{i}, t jik represents the transfer of goods among consumers. Alternatively, when the k-th good is labor supplied by the i-th consumer, then x ik ≤ 0 and t jik ≤ 0, and (1b) implies that the i-th consumer cannot sell more labor than available net of resources used in exchange: ( jN |t jik |)  |x ik | -z ik , i  N c . Finally, note that t jj = 0 and t ji = -t ij for i, j  N s imply that  jN s  i N s t ji = 0. Similarly, t ii = 0 and t ji = -t ij for i, j  N c imply that  j N c  iN c t ji = 0.
Then, summing both (1a) and (1b) across agents, we obtain
which is the commodity balance equation, stating that aggregate consumption of each good cannot exceed its aggregate production, minus its aggregate use in exchange.
Note that our analysis is very general. It allows for differentiated products. It allows for labor exchange between consumers and producers. When labor is the k-th good, then x ik ≤ 0 for all consumers, y jk  0 for all producers and the labor supplied by the i-th consumer to the j-th producer is given by t jik ≤ 0. In the analysis of allocation decisions, it will be useful to consider the following function.
Definition 3: For any g  m R  satisfying g  0, define the i-th agent's benefit function as
= - otherwise, for i  N c . The aggregate benefit function is then defined as
where U = {U i : i  N c }.
The benefit function B(x, U) gives the largest amount of the bundle g that consumers facing utilities U are willing to give up to reach consumption x (Allais, 1943 (Allais, , 1981 Luenberger, 1992a Luenberger, , 1992b . 4 As such, it is a convenient measure of consumer benefits. Under the assumptions that the set X i is convex for each i  N and the function u i (x) is quasi-concave, the benefit function b i (x i , U i ) is concave in x i and non-increasing in U i for i  N c (Luenberger, 1992b, p. 464-466) . Then, the aggregate benefit function B(x, U) is concave in x and non-increasing in U.
Efficiency under Externalities, Transaction Costs and Non-Convexity
This section investigates the efficiency of allocation under externalities and transaction cost. For that purpose, we rely on the reference bundle g = (0, …, 0, 1)  m R  . It will be convenient to interpret the m-th commodity as money. Then, choosing g = (0, …, 0, 1)  m R  means that we focus on a monetary economy. In the case where the unit price of the bundle g is 1,
this implies that our welfare measurements involve monetary evaluations. We make the following assumption.
Assumption A1: Given g = (0, 0, …, 1), an allocation exhibits free g-distribution if (-z, t)  Z implies that (-z, t')  Z for any t' satisfying t jr ' = t jr for all j  N s and r  N, t rqk ' = t rqk for all r  N c , q  N c and k ≠ m, and  qN c t iqm ' =  qN c t iqm for any i  N c .
For any consumer i  N c , assumption A1 states that, ceteris paribus, the feasibility of exchange remains unaffected by any transfer of the m-th good from the i-th consumer toward other consumers when the aggregate ( qN c t iqm ) remains constant. It means that the m-th good (money) can be exchanged or redistributed among consumers without cost, i.e. without changing the amount z of resources used in exchange. However, assumption A1 still allows transaction costs to arise when any exchange in the first (m-1) commodities takes place among agents.
Following Luenberger (1992a Luenberger ( , 1995a , consider the following concept:
Definition 5: Define a maximal allocation as an allocation (x, y, z, t) satisfying
And (x, y, z, t) is zero maximal if, in addition, U is chosen in (4) such that V(U) = 0.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the optimization problem (4) (Allais, 1943 (Allais, , 1981 Luenberger, 1995a) . From (4), a maximal allocation makes the distributable surplus as large as possible. And zero maximality means that this surplus must be entirely redistributed to consumers. Then, intuitively, Pareto efficiency involves situations where the distributable surplus is maximized and then entirely redistributed. Up to this point, our results were obtained allowing for externalities, and without assuming the convexity of the sets Y or Z. And the efficiency of allocation was evaluated without any reference to prices. Such results can thus be interpreted as characterizing efficient contracts or policies under transaction costs, externalities and non-convexity. Next, we introduce prices and examine their role in evaluating Pareto efficiency.
A Dual Approach to Efficiency
Below, we examine a dual general equilibrium model. While a dual approach to efficiency analysis is not new (e.g., Dixit and Norman; Luenberger, 1994) , our analysis extends previous research to include situations of externalities, transaction costs and non-convexity.
Define F as the set of continuous and non-decreasing functions f from R m to R that satisfy the translation property: f(y + α g) = α + f(y) for any y  R m and any α  R. Consider the generalized Lagrangian functional L:
where f = (f 1 , …, f n s )  F s ≡ F × … × F and h = (h 1 , …, h n c )  F c ≡ F × … × F are "penalty functions" associated with constraints (1a) and (1b), respectively. Given g = (0, …0, 1) where the m-th commodity is used as a numeraire good, the translation property of f and h means that f i and h i can be interpreted as monetary values of goods associated with the i-th agent, i  N. In this 12 context, we will interpret the functions f and h as reflecting pricing schemes. This will become particularly relevant in the analysis of market institutions.
We first present the mathematical arguments supporting our dual approach. Consider
The relationships between L * (U), V(U) and L # (U) have been investigated in the literature.
In general, the following "weak duality" relationships hold (Bertsekas; Rubinov et al.; Chavas and Briec) :
Expression (8) 
Proposition 3 establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a saddle point of the generalized Lagrangian L(x, y, z, t, f, h, U) as given in (9). Equations (10a) and (10b) (1a) and (1b) stating that the use of any good cannot exceed its availability for any agent. For this allocation, equations (11a) and (11b) Equations (10a) and (11a) 
Combining (14) with Proposition 3, it follows that a zero duality gap (when L * (U) = V(U)) implies the existence of a saddle point in (9). But when does a zero duality gap exist? To answer this question, define condition that is required to support a dual representation of economic efficiency. We assume that this condition is satisfied through the rest of the paper.
Proposition 4: A maximal allocation satisfies
We interpret the function f j as measuring the value of goods associated with the j-th producer, j  N s , and the function h i as measuring the value of goods associated with the i-th consumer, i  N c . In equation (16) The relationships between zero minimality and Pareto efficiency are presented next.
Under a zero duality gap, the following result follows directly from Propositions 1 and 4. would generate a unique welfare distribution among consumers.
The Coase Theorem
Propositions 4, 5 and 6 provide a dual characterization of Pareto efficiency under nonconvexity and transaction costs. They give a number of new insights on the evaluation of efficiency under broad conditions. First, our analysis generalizes the Coase theorem (Coase 1960 ). Indeed, expression (17) shows that aggregate profit maximization for production activities is consistent with Pareto efficiency. This is the essence of the Coase theorem: aggregate profit maximization supports an efficient management of externalities (Coase 1960) . But Coase's analysis was presented assuming no transaction costs and with no special attention given to the role of non-convexity. We showed that aggregate profit maximization remains a valid characterization of the efficient management of externalities under two significant generalizations: 1/ the presence of transactions costs; and 2/ non-convex production and exchange technologies. This is an important result. The arguments that Coase presented in his 1960 paper (mostly on intuitive ground) are not only correct, but they actually apply under very general conditions. As such, the analysis presented in Coase (1960) is a great example of the power of intuition in economics. Such accomplishments were instrumental in Coase winning the Nobel Prize in 1991.
Our analysis shows another important extension of the Coase theorem. Expression (18) states that aggregate profit maximization for exchange is also consistent with Pareto efficiency. This is an insight that was explored in details in Coase (1937) , but not in Coase (1960) (where the arguments were presented mostly assuming zero transaction costs). In that sense, our analysis provides a nice integration of Coase's two seminal papers. First, it shows that the consistency of 18 aggregate profit maximization and Pareto efficiency applies to exchange activities as well. This holds under very general conditions, including the presence of externalities in exchange activities and non-convex exchange technology. Second, as stressed in Coase (1937) , evaluating the relative efficiency of markets versus non-market institutions requires addressing the role of transaction costs. This is the "missing piece of the puzzle" in Coase (1960) . While knowing that production externalities are efficiently managed is important, identifying which institution can perform their management efficiently requires knowing their associated transaction costs. Our analysis provides the needed integration. It indicates that a particular institution would provide an efficient management of externalities if it maximized aggregate profit, measured as the sum of aggregate profit from production activities (as stated in (17)) and aggregate profit from exchange activities (as stated in (18)). As further discussed below, the profit maximization in (18) implies the minimization of transaction costs. It means that minimizing transaction costs is an integral part of an efficient allocation. This shows that the evaluation of economic institutions on efficiency grounds must involve their ability both to maximize aggregate production profit (as argued in Coase (1960) ) and to minimize transaction costs (as argued in Coase (1937) ).
The Effects of Non-Convexity
Note that expenditure minimization in (16) and profit maximization in (17) and (18) These results always hold under convexity. To see that, note that under convexity, the functions f and h can be taken to be linear: f j (y j ) = p si y j , j  N s , and h i (x i ) = p ci x i , i  N c . This follows directly from the separating hyperplane theorem, which implies the existence of the coefficients p si and p ci . These coefficients become standard Lagrange multipliers in (5), which measure the shadow prices of the corresponding constraints (Takayama) . And in a market economy, the coefficients p si and p ci become the competitive prices that clear the markets and support an efficient allocation (Debreu; Mas-Colell et al.) . Then, equation (15) But our analysis is developed allowing for non-convexity. While the investigation of nonconvexity is not new (e.g., Guesnerie), our analysis extends previous research by allowing for externalities and transaction costs. In this context, it is well known that introducing nonconvexity for Y or Z can invalidate the standard welfare theorems. A simple example is the case of production decisions made in the presence of fixed cost, where the technology exhibits increasing returns to scale and the set Y is non-convex. Then, under marginal cost pricing, competition cannot be efficient because competitive firms would make a negative profit (as marginal cost is less than average cost) and would choose to exit rather than produce efficiently.
In this case, uniform pricing would be inefficient. Equation (16) shows that the problem does not come from profit maximization: it comes from uniform pricing. In the presence of positive fixed 20 cost, one could restore efficiency by moving away from uniform pricing and implement a twopart pricing scheme: a "fixed fee" that covers fixed cost; and a "constant unit price" that covers marginal cost (Chavas and Briec) . A similar argument would apply in the presence of fixed costs in exchange (e.g., in transportation, marketing, or information search), where the exchange technology exhibits increasing returns to scale and the set Z is non-convex. In these cases, nonconvexity means that the separating hyperplane theorem does not hold and uniform prices fail to support an efficient allocation. But efficiency can be attained by implementing the pricing schemes f * and h * identified in (19). Then, the functions f * and h * are non-linear separating hypersurfaces with slopes representing non-linear prices (Chavas and Briec) . This shows that non-linear pricing is an integral part of efficiency under non-convexity. While the analysis of non-linear pricing is not new (e.g., Aliprantis et al.) , its explicit linkage with non-convexity is of significant interest. To the extent that fixed costs are rather common in production and marketing activities, this has two implications: 1/ it is inappropriate to insist on uniform pricing in the efficiency evaluation of market allocations in the presence of fixed costs; and 2/ non-linear pricing may be required to implement an efficient allocation in many markets. This stresses the need to expand the efficiency analysis of markets to include price discrimination schemes. As noted by Wilson, non-linear pricing and price discrimination are commonly observed in many markets. While such markets would not be classified as competitive, our analysis shows that they can support an efficient allocation under non-convexity.
Finally, recall that we allow for non-convexity in the production technology Y as well as the exchange technology Z. These two sources can affect the pricing for both f * and h on a "visible hand" as pricing decisions would be made by managers and/or policy makers. In turn, such management and policy decisions will typically not be costless. This implies that, under non-convexity and non-linear pricing, efficient pricing would also be subject to transaction costs. In this context, non-convexity and transaction cost would interact as they affect the efficiency of economic institutions, whether they are markets or non-market institutions.
The Effects of Transaction Costs
Our analysis has incorporated transaction costs in economic and welfare analysis. While the analysis of market equilibrium under transaction cost is not new (e.g., Coase (1937) (18) can depend on the exchanges t among all agents. These complexities help explain why progress on the economics of transaction costs has been difficult and slow.
To simplify the arguments, the discussion presented in this section will focus on the 
Expression (20) can be alternatively expressed as
where C(t, p s , p c ) = min z { iN c p ci z i +  j N s p si z j : (-z, t)  Z},
is the transaction cost function, representing the aggregate cost of resources used in exchange.
The transaction cost function C(t, p s , p c ) in (22) To illustrate, consider the implications of (21) for the choice of t ij as an output exchanged from agent j to agent i. Then, under differentiability, (21) implies the familiar Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to t jik  0:
[-C/t jik + p cik -p sjk ]  t jik = 0.
Equation (23a) implies that (p cik -p sjk )  C/t jik , i.e. that the price difference for commodity k between agents i and j (p cik -p sjk ) cannot exceed the marginal transaction cost C/t jik . And when exchange takes place from agent j to agent i for the k-th commodity (t jik > 0), then (23a) and (23b) imply that (p cik -p sjk ) = C/t jik . In this case, the price difference (p cik -p sjk ) must equal the marginal transaction cost C/t jik . This is the first-order condition for profit maximizing exchange. In the absence of transaction costs (where C/t jik = 0), it follows that p cjk = p sik for all i, j  N. This gives the intuitive result: in a competitive market economy, zero transaction cost implies the law of one price. Alternatively, when C/t jik > 0, transaction costs create a price wedge between p cik and p sjk . In such situation, the law of one price fails to apply.
This allows the development of "local markets" where participants in each market are endogenously determined (depending on transaction technology and price differences). This is relevant in economic geography, where spatial prices typically vary across agents. And when transaction costs are "high enough" so that C/t jik > (p cik -p sjk ) for some j and i satisfying (p cik -24 p sjk )  0, then exchange disappears as (23b) implies t jik = 0. The k-th commodity becomes nonexchanged between agents j and i. If this happens for all agents, this implies the absence of exchange for the k-th commodity. This illustrates well the adverse effects of transaction costs on exchange. It shows that minimizing transaction costs is critical in the proper functioning of efficient exchange.
This applies to markets as well as non-market governance structures. It means that transaction costs contribute to both incomplete markets and incomplete contracts. Under uncertainty and costly information, this means that risk markets would be incomplete and contracts would be based on coarse information. And asymmetric information makes this worse.
Indeed, exchange can only be based on information that is available to all parties involved. If information varies across agents, this restricts exchange to depend only on common information.
As shown by Radner, this can greatly restrict the potential for risk markets to develop. And this highlights the importance of information in the design of efficient contracts, a point that has been stressed in the literature (e.g., Tirole; Salanié).
This has several important implications. First, under transaction costs, resource allocation can still be Pareto efficient in the absence of exchange (if this absence is motivated by large transaction costs). When applied to market economies, this means that Pareto efficiency can still apply when some markets are inactive (e.g., risk markets trading state-contingent commodities).
And when applied to contracts, this can help explain incomplete contracts (e.g., due to high information cost; see Tirole). Second, in the presence of high transaction costs, the number of participants in exchange is expected to be low. In market economies, this suggests that competitive market structures (with large number of traders) are unlikely to arise under high transaction costs. In such situations, non-market mechanisms (e.g., contracts) would likely be needed to obtain an efficient resource allocation. Third, lowering transaction costs increases the 25 incentive to exchange. This indicates that competitive market structures are more likely to be found under low transaction costs. They can help support an efficient allocation in the absence of externalities. However, in the presence of externalities, contracts, changes in organizational structure, and/or government interventions are needed to attain efficiency. And contracts can be expected to be effective in dealing with externalities only if transaction costs are low or moderate.
Implications for Decentralized Decision Making
Equations (16)- (18), along with propositions 5 and 6, provide useful insights on whether decentralized decision-making can support Pareto efficiency. Equation (16) First, consider the case of externalities in production. This is given by the feasible set Y representing the joint technology of production across all producers. Externality means that decisions made by each producer can affect other producers. In this context, a decentralization of production decisions will in general be inefficient. Indeed, if each firm attempts to maximize its profit, it would neglect the external effects it has on other firms. However, equation (17) provides the efficient solution under production externalities. As discussed above, this is the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960) , stating that efficient production decisions should be made in way consistent with aggregate profit maximization. It shows that properly designed contracts among producers facing externalities can restore efficiency. As noted above, such a result applies under very general conditions (e.g., under transaction costs and non-convexity).
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As a special case, consider the situation where there is no production externality. It means that the production technology is non-joint and that Y = Y 1 …Y n , where y i  Y i , Y i being the feasible set for the i-th agent, i  N. In this context, equation (17) becomes
where
is the profit maximizing condition for the j-th producer, j  N s . Thus, without production externalities, given pricing (f * , h * ), making production decisions through decentralized profit maximization is consistent with efficiency. This shows that it is the presence of externalities (and not the presence of transaction costs or non-convexity) that threatens the efficiency of decentralized production decisions. This stresses that the management of production externalities must rely on some coordination scheme among the affected producers. Evaluating which institution can best implement this coordination (e.g., contracts versus government policy) would depend on the transaction costs associated with each.
Next, consider the case of externalities in exchange. This is given by the feasible set Z representing the joint technology of exchange among all agents. Externality means that exchange decisions between any two agents can affect other agents (e.g., the case of information network).
In this context, a decentralization of exchange decisions will in general be inefficient: it would neglect external effects on other agents. However, equation (18) 
where  Tji (p sj , p ci ) = max t,z {p ci t ji -p sj t ji -p sj z ij : (-z i , t ij )  Z ij }, i, j  N.
In this case, (25b) corresponds to profit maximization for exchange activities between agent j and agent i. This means that, in the absence of exchange externality among all agents, exchange decisions can be efficiently decentralized for each pair of agents. In this case, decentralized bilateral exchange would be efficient (e.g., as analyzed by Feldman, and Goldman and Starr) . This shows that it is the presence of externalities (and not the presence of transaction costs or non-convexity) that threatens the efficiency of decentralized exchange. Again, this stresses that the management of exchange externalities must rely on some coordination scheme among the affected agents. Then, both exchange externalities and transaction costs would play a role in assessing the efficiency of exchange and its governance structure.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated the effects of externalities, transaction costs and nonconvexity on the efficiency of resource allocation. It applies to markets as well as non-market governance structures. Our analysis stresses several points. First, relying on the benefit function,
we investigate the efficiency of resource allocation under transaction costs and externalities.
Second, we examine the effects of transaction costs on efficient allocations and exchange. We note that the absence of some markets (e.g., risk markets) can still be consistent with Pareto efficiency when transaction costs are high. A similar argument applies to the existence of incomplete contracts (Tirole) . Third, our analysis provides new insights on the relative efficiency of markets versus non-market institutions. Fourth, lowering transaction costs is expected to enhance the efficiency of contracts and markets and to stimulate the demand for exchange. It suggests that policies targeted to lower transaction costs (e.g., due to better infrastructure and improved information) would play a crucial role in enhancing the efficiency of resource allocation. Finally, our analysis provides insights on the efficiency of decentralized exchange under transaction costs. In the context of contracts, we show that it is the combination of transaction cost and externalities that is crucial in the evaluation of organizational structure. Such a combination can help motivate mergers and/or vertical integration as means of improving efficiency under transaction costs.
